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In the Suprenie Court
of the State o.f Utah

CARL T. EVANS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
PICKETT BROS. FARMS, a
Partnership, and JESS W. PICKETT,
otherwise known as J. W. Pickett,
Defendants and Appellants

Case No. 12616

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is a case based upon an old agreement for leveling land, with a disagreement on final price, and
failure to pay the matter in full, based on either party's
interpretation. The statute of limitations is the primary
question involved.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the lower court on the
10th of May, 1971, without a jury, the Honorable Harlan Burns presiding, and was completed in a matter of
approximately two hours. Thereafter, the Honorable J.
Harlan Burns took the matter under advisement, and on

J:

the 9th of June, 1971, rendered a memorandum decisio
in which he found that Exhibit No. 1 changed the coi:
tract from an oral contract to a sufficiently writte
agreement for Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 195.1
to be applicable thereto. This item coupled with par
ment on a later date, or a tender of payment on a la~1
date, was interpreted by the Court as extending thi
matter past the time of filing the complaint under thi
six-year statute of limitations, and judgment for t~
plaintiff was awarded.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants and appellants desire that the dee:·
sion be reversed, and that the complaint be dismissec
with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During 1959 there was a negotiation between Je~
W. Picket, representing himself and a brother ~
Pickett Bros. Farms, a partnership, and the plaintiff. Thi
exact dates of the negotiation are not certain. As a r~
sult of the negotiation, an oral agreement was enteret
into whereby approximately 40 acres of land was to~·
leveled by Mr. Evans for Pickett Bros. Farms with Agri
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (A.S.C.
participation as to part of the payment, and Soil Con
servation Service to provide the engineering. The nece'·
sary applications were made by Mr. Pickett to A.S.C. for
their participation, The leveling was performed in'
more or less satisfactory manner, plaintiff contendirir
that it was strictly in accordance with the contract 0
$10.00 an hour, the defendants contending that an esti·
mate of approximately $2100.00 was the agreed price
'' .>Jt;;..~
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based upon whatever oral agreement had gone before
them. The work was done in October and 'November of
1959. and was completed November 29, 1959. Thereafter,
on 14 December, 1959, the defendant, J. W. Pickett signed for Pickett Bros. Farms by himself and dated said document 14 December, 1959, a purchase order for conservation materials on forms provided oy the ·A.s.c. A copy
of this document has been entered in evidence as Exhibit 1. The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service paid $1,000. On April 25, 1969, the defendants paid $100; on 3 September, 1961, $300.00, the check
for which is marked Exhibit 2, · and another check also
marked Exhibit 2 was tendered on 2 January, 1962, in
the amount of $700 with a statement on the back, "Full
and Final Payment." This check was never cashed by
the plaintiff. It appears that there are two Exhibits 1
and two Exhibits 2, the check for $100.00 being one Exhibit 1, and the A.S.C. order being the other Exhibit 1;
the check for $300.00 being one exhibit 2, and the check
for $700.00 being the other exhibit 2. The trial court
treated these items as follows: Plaintiff's Exhibit!, A.S.C.
order of 14 December, 1959; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, the
check for $300.00 dated 2 September, 1961; Plaintiff's
Exhibit 3. the check for $700.00 dated 2 January, 1962
that was not cashed. The complaint was filed on October 11, 1967, commencing this action.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE IS
TITLE 78-12-25 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953.
The trial court ruled that Exhibit 1, being the pay3

ment order of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service dated 14 December, 1959, constituted
a sufficient document in writing to be a contract and
to invoke the six-year statute of limitations, to-wit, 78·
12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, rather than the four·
year state of limitations contended by the defendants.
The defendant had plead both of these statutes as a bar
to the action. The Court, in applying this statute then
ruled that the tender of the last check for $700.00, to·
wit, Exqibit 3, also made the six-year application to this
check~,eXl:ended it a sufficient period of time so that the
finding by the Court of the absence of Mr. Pickett from
the state of Utah from January 2, 1962, to April 1, 196~,
and other periods on which the Court did not elaborate,
commenced running on the statute on 3 September, 1961,
when the last payment was made, and that the absenres
thereafter held the statute sufficiently to have the fil·
ing of October 11, 1967, within the six-year period which
the Court contended was the proper application under
Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that Ex·
hibit 1 also made this a six-year statute.
Under these conditions, the primary question is whe·
ther there was an oral agreement or a written agree·
men. To commence with, the Court, in Finding No. 2,
made a finding that the contract made during October
of 1959 was orally negotiated, and that it was orally
agreed that the plaintiff would be paid by said defend·
ants the sum of $10.00 per hour for the time plaintiff
spent in operating his land-leveling equipment, and
performing said land-leveling, a portion of which would
be paid by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva·
tion Service, and the balance would be paid by the de·
fendant. The Court further found in Finding No. 3 that
pursuant to the oral negotiations the plaintiff did the
4

work between November 1, 1959, and November 29, 1959.
This is verified in the transcript on Page 41, commencing with Line 2, and ending on Line 6. Also, the pleadings, which have not been amended in any way, show
that this was an oral agreement. While in Paragraph 3
of the complaint a written agreement is plead, the attachment to the complaint shows that this was the item
that is Exhibit J and was the payment order of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. The
answer of the defendants filed in personum pleads an
or<i l contract. The supplemental answer of the defendants pleads an oral agreement, and pleads both the sixyear and four-year statute of limitations, as well as tender and refus;-il. The plaintiff's reply to supplemental
answer of the defendants admitted and alleged an oral
agreement on or about the 1st of November, 1959. None
of these pleadings are amended, nor at the conclusion
of the trial was any motion made to amend the pleading in conformity with the trial, or the findings, and
the findings find the oral agreement prior to the 29th of
November, 1959, and the completion by that date.
Under these conditions, the next question is whether or not there was any written agreement pertaining
to the A.S.C. payment order signed by Mr. Pickett on 13
December, 1959. This actually amounts to nothing but or
an order to pay. A check is a statement to the bank to
pay This is a statement to the A.S.C. to pay, and payment was made thereon, just exactly the same as if it
had been a check. Was this a sufficient item in writing to
change the oral agreement from the four-year to the
six-year statute of limitations? The State of Utah in
the S11pr'me Court thereof has many times ruled that
items of this nature are not sufficient items in writing
to make this change, Paragraph (2) of Title 78-12-23,
Utah Coclp Annotated, 1953, reads as follows:
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"An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing,
except those mentioned in the preceding section."
Under these conditions, this is not an action on a con·
tract founded on an instrument in writing. At no place
had Mr. Evans, the plaintiff, signed this document, nor
was it intended or ever used for anything but an order
to pay, nor does it in any way change the terms of the
oral agreement admitted by both parties. There are
many cases of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
that have interpreted items of this nature all to be noth·
ing that changed the oral contract. One of these cases
is Whitehill vs. Lowe, found in 10 Utah 419 and 427, and
at 37 P. 589. In this case the plaintiff contended that
through two verbal agreements he had an interest in a
written agreement. The Court held that the four-year
statute applied and was in effect.
In the case of Woolf vs. Gray, 48 Utah 239, 158 P.
788, there was a cause of action for goods and merchan·
dise on an account stated. In this matter a partner of
the concern which had run the account for goods :uid
merchandise had confessed judgment and judgment had
been granted against the partner. In this case the Su·
preme Court of the State of Utah held that even though
the partner had confessed judgment and the judgment
had been entered, this was not sufficient to extend the
four-year statute of limitations against the other partner
who had not confessed judgment, and in no way effected
his liability and that the four-year statute of limitation
applied.
In the case of O'Donnell vs. Parker, 48 Utah 578, 160
P. 1192, the defendant owed an open account to the
plaintiff. The defendant had taken bankruptcy and even
6

though outlawed, had listed the amount of the open
account in one of the schedules to be barred by the
bankruptcy. However, thereafter the bankruptcy failed.
The question there was whether or not the listing in the
bankruptcy over a sworn signature of the defendant
was sufficient to extend the four-year statute of limitations, or to take it out of the four-year statute of limiitations and make the six-year statute of limitations
apply, and the Court held "No", that it had nothing to
do with the matter and that it did not extend any statute of limitations and did not make the six-year statute
apply. This is very similar to the case at bar. An order
to pay has been interpreted by the trial court as taking it outside of the four-year statute and making it
into the six-year statute so that the six-year statute
would apply. Certainly, this is no greater acknowledgment of debt than the listing of the same in a bankruptcy
proceeding.
In the matter of Jeremy Fuel & Grain Company vs.
Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. found in 60 Utah 153 and
in 207 P. 155, this is an action to recover 35c a ton on
excess freight charges on coal that had been shipped
out of Carbon County to various places. The total involved was $58,962.80. The question was on an item
of this nature on \vhich a bill of lading had been
issued on each car, did the four-year statute of limitations apply on the open account, or did a statutory provision apply that provided for double damages. The
Court held that the four-year statute of limitations applied even though there had been a Rio Grande bill of
lading on each car, and the double damages were not
allowed. The six-year question was not gone into on that
case. However, it was compared to a statute that would
have given double damages.
In the case of Last Chance Ranch Company vs
7

Erickson found in 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2nd 952, the defendant had conveyed real property to the plaintiff and had
agreed orally to assign stock in a farm loan associ.:i·
tion to the plaintiff at once. The same oral agreement
was reitera@ one year and three months after conveyance of the real property. The Court held that the fouryear statute of limitations applied, and that it was not,
at the time of the action, necessary to transfer the stock
in the farm loan assocation.
In the matter of Petty & Riddle, Inc. vs. Lunt, 104
Utah 130, 138 P. 2d 648, in which the judgment of the
lower court was reversed upon a presentation by the firm
of Morris & Matheson, Attorneys at Law, Cedar City,
Utah, representing the appellant. The plaintiff corpora·
tion brought an action against the stockholders for the
contribution toward payment of taxes due and unpaid
when corporate assets or surplus was divided among
stockholders.
The trial court instructed the jury to bring in a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff corporation for $238.86
on the first cause of action and $530.55 on the second
cause of action, on the theory that when stockholder'
divided the assets of the corporation there was an im·
plied contract to pay the debts. The opposing counsel
for the plaintiff is one of the attorneys who took this
action to the Supreme Court for the stockholder, and
the Supreme Court held that the stockholder had no
responsibility toward either the individuals that had
previously owned stock in the corporation or the corp·
oration itself for corporate debts after the four-year
statute of limitations had run, on the theory that there
was an implied oral contract to pay those bills and that
the four-year statute was applicable. The taxes in ques·
tion were paid on April 15, 1935, by the corporation and
8

the action against the stockholder Lunt was commenced
on the 11th of May, 1940. The cause of action arose when
the corporation became aware that the taxes in question were still unpaid, and from that time until the action was commenced was more than four years, and
therefore it was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
The case of Juab County Department of Public Welfare vs. Summers, et al., 19 Utah 2d 49, 426 P.2d 1, relied upon by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns in his memorandum decision in the instant case was not 8l, point.
There, there was a Public Welfare lien agreement which
was held to be under the six-year statute. This was a
specific pledge agreement made on a statutory form,
and on which thereafter money was paid by the Juab
County Department of Public Welfare, and it is identical
with a mortgage. It is not in point in the instant case.
The case of Strand vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 6 Utah 2d 279, 312 P.2d 561, also relied on by the
Honorable J. Harlan Burns in his memorandum decision,
is against the findings in the memorandum decision.
In this case there was a written agreement on
10 December, 1943. Due to difficulties and various other things, in September, 1944 an oral agreement took place which entirely changed the written
agreement. The Court held that they changed the written agret>ment and plans and specifications to such an
extent that a new plan had to be drawn. The specifications were not rewritten, but oral agreements for the
changes in the specifications were relied on under the
circumstances, and the contract became an oral one,
and any claim arising under such a contract is governed
by the four-year statute of limitations. The action was
brought under such conditions that it was within the
six-year period from the original contract, but not with9

in the four-year period from the oral contract.
The conclusion from all these cases is that in tni
instant case Exhibit 1 is nothing more than an acknowl
edgment and an order to pay, and was not the agre~
ment required by Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotateu
1953, and as a result, Title 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotat·
ed, 1953, should be applicable to this situation.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 7812-23, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, TO
EXHIBIT 1.

In pursuance of this, a re-reading of the authoritiei
in Point I shows that all these items again point out
that the contract was an oral contract; that exhibit 1.
is not a contract, but an order to pay after the work wa>
done, and that under these conditions 78-12-23, Utan
Code Annotated, 1953, does not apply.
POINT III
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
HAD RUN BEFORE FILING THE COMPLAINT.
The four-year statute of limitations had entirely
run before the filing of the complaint, regardless of any
item of being out of the State. The latest interpretation
that could in any way be given to this matter under the
four-year statute would be four years from the last pay·
mentor acknowledgment. This came on or about the 2nd
of January, 1962, according to the testimony of Mr
Evans on Page 64, commencing at Line 26 of the tran·
script. Four years from that time would be the 2nd of
January, 1966. The instant case was not filed until the
11th of October, 1967. There is no item later than the
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of Jnnuary, Hl62, that could in any way be called
an acknokledgement, and under these conditions, the
statute of limitation had run before the filing of the
complaint.
~?nd

POINT IV
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY A
FINDING OF OUT OF THE STATE EXCEPT
THE PERIOD FROM 2 JANUARY, 1962 TO I
APRIL, 1962.
In Findings of Facts drawn by plaintiff's counsel,
who is the same counsel who supported the four-year
statute of limitations in the Petty & Riddle vs. Lunt
case cited above, in Paragraph 7 the Court found in the
last lines thereof to the effect that the partners were
outside of the State of Utah, namely, from January 2,
1962, to April 1, 1962. In Paragraph 9 the Court found
as follows: "that the running of said six year statute of
limitations was tolled from January 2, 1962, to April 1.
1962. when both partners were outside of the State of
Utah. and the running of said six year State of Limitations was further tolled by both of said partners being
out of state of Utah for other substantial periods as
shown by the evidence herein." A complete review of
the transcript finds mention in Mr. Pickett's testimony
of three additional weeks that he was out of the State.
Thrn, is no other evidence whatsoever to support any
finding that the defendant was out of the State other
than the period of 2 January, 1962, to 1 April, 1962, during the period that we are concerned about.
CONCLUSION

Inasmuch as the findings pertaining to the defend-
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ant being out of the State are not supported by evi
dence, there is no substantiation for the finding tha·
the six-year statute has been tolled by the absence 0
the defendant from September of 1961 on, inasmuC'h a
Exhibit 1 is nothing but an order to pay and is not
contract, as required by the terms of U.C.A. for the six
year statute in Title 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotateo
1953. The four-year statute was applicable. The statut:
of limitations was tolled, and the complaint was filei
after the statute of limitations had run, and the matter
should be dism~ssed with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants,
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720
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